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The 1988 version of the message encryption and authentication
procedures for Internet electronic mail makes use of a
'Bidirectional MAC' or BMAC.  When used for multi-cast
electronic mail it is important that this BMAC acts as a one-
way function.  We show here that it is not a one-way function,





The 'Internet' electronic mail system is widely used both
within the U.S. and world-wide.  Because of the practical
importance of this electronic mail network, and because of the
sensitive nature of some of the information sent over the
network, a 'Privacy Task Force' was set up to recommend ways
in which the system could be made secure.
As a result of their efforts, a number of 'Request For
Comments' (RFC) documents have been produced:  RFC989, [10],
in February 1987, RFC1040, [11], in January 1988 (a revised
version of RFC989) and, most recently, RFCs 1113, [12], 1114,
[9] and 1115, [13], in August 1989 (superseding RFC 1040).
These documents describe procedures for message encipherment
and authentication.
Unfortunately, the authentication scheme described in RFC989
contains a serious flaw when used for multi-cast messages
(i.e. messages sent to more than one recipient).  This flaw
enables one recipient of such a message to successfully send a
bogus message to another recipient in an undetectable way,
[15].  We now briefly consider the nature of this flaw,
described in more detail by Mitchell and Walker, [16].
The scheme described in RFC989 relies on the sender of a
message computing a 'digest' of the message using a pre-
determined 'hash function', h say.  The digest is then
encrypted using each of the recipient keys in turn, and all
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the encrypted digests are sent with the message.  These
recipient keys are known only to the message originator and
the particular recipient.  The effectiveness of the scheme
depends on the hash function h, which must satisfy a number of
properties, and the encryption of the digests (this latter
point we do not consider here).  The first important property
h must satisfy is that if the message M is input to h, then
the output h(M) (typically of 64 or 128 bits) must depend on
all of M.  The second requirement is that h should exhibit the
following 'one way' property:
H1.  Given any possible candidate for a digest, C say, it
must be computationally infeasible to find a message M such
that h(M) = C.
In the scheme described in RFC989, [10], it is suggested that
the U.S. standard DES algorithm, [1], [6] is used in the
standardised Cipher Block Chaining Mode, [2], [7], [8] to
produce a 64-bit Message Authentication Code or MAC.  This is
precisely the technique standardised in the U.S. for
authenticating financial messages, [3], [4].  (Note that the
description of CBC mode given in Mitchell, [15], is
incorrect).
The key used to compute this MAC is different for each
message, and is sent (along with the digest) encrypted under
each of the recipient keys.  This means that, for the system
to be secure for multi-cast messages, the DES CBC MAC must
satisfy H1 even when the key is known.  Unfortunately this is
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not the case, [15], and this is the source of the weakness in
RFC989.
As a result, RFC1040 ([11], section A.2) describes a second
function for computing digests called a 'Bidirectional MAC' or
BMAC, and suggests that this function should be used for
multi-cast mail instead of the conventional MAC.  Presumably
it was hoped by the authors of RFC1040 that the BMAC function
satisfies H1 even when the key used to generate it is known;
unfortunately this is not the case, as we describe in the next
section.  Showing that BMAC does not satisfy H1 is the main
purpose of this short paper.
Perhaps because of the attack described below, the BMAC
algorithm has been dropped from the latest, August 1989, set
of RFCs, [9], [12], [13].  The algorithm which replaces it,
described in RFC 1115, [13], appears far stronger.
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II.  THE BMAC IS NOT A 1-WAY FUNCTION
A.  Definition of the BMAC
We start by describing how a BMAC is computed.  To do this we
first describe how a MAC is computed.  The message to be
processed is first divided into a sequence of 64-bit blocks
(if necessary, the last block is padded out):
M1, M2, ..., Mr
say.  The sequence
C1, C2, ..., Cr
is then computed, where
Ci = EK{ Mi + Ci-1 }                                     (1)
where, by convention, C0 is the all-zero block and, as
throughout this paper, + denotes bit-wise exclusive-or and
EK{} denotes DES encryption using the key K.  The MAC is then
equal to the final block Cr.
To compute the BMAC, the message is again divided into the
sequence (Mi) (1 ≤ i ≤ r).  The sequence (Ci) (1 ≤ i ≤ r) is
computed as before, and, in addition the sequence (Bi)
(1 ≤ i ≤ r) is computed, where
Bi = EK{ Mi + Bi+1 }                                     (2)
where, by convention, Br+1  is the all-zero block.  The BMAC
then consists of the pair of 64-bit blocks (Cr,B1).  In other
words, the BMAC consists of a pair of MACs, one computed
forwards and the other computed backwards.
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B.  Breaking the BMAC
We now show how, given any pair of 64-bit blocks and a key K,
a message can be constructed which gives this pair of blocks
as its BMAC.  This implies that the BMAC function is not one-
way and hence the RFC1040 scheme is not secure.
The method we propose here allows us to choose the message
arbitrarily, except that it must contain two 64-bit blocks
which will be essentially random in nature.  These 'garbage'
blocks are present in order to make the BMAC come out right.
In the method described below, these two blocks will be at the
beginning and at the end of the message; however, the method
can be very simply modified to allow them to be located almost
anywhere in the message.
Suppose that the supplied pair of blocks is (C,B) and the
supplied key is K.  Suppose also that the message to be
'matched' to the BMAC (C,B) is M, where M can be divided into
two parts M1, M2.  In addition choose at random a 64-bit block
X.  We now do two sets of very similar computations.
First prepare 232 variants of M1, each variant consisting of a
whole number of 64-bit blocks (although the number of blocks
in each variant may vary).  Davies and Price ([5], pages 278,
279) illustrate a simple technique by which this may be done
so that each variant is valid English and each variant is
semantically the same.  Basically, if n points are identified
within the message at which two possible wordings have the
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same meaning, then 2n different variants of the message may be
derived.  One simple possibility is to insert either one or
two spaces after the end of each sentence.
For each variant do the following computations (where we
suppose that N2, N3, ..., Ns is the decomposition of the
variant into 64-bit blocks - note that the first block of the
variant is not defined at this stage):
- For every i (i = s, s-1, ..., 2) let:
Fi = EK{ Ni + Fi+1 }                                   (3)
where Fs+1 = X.
- Let:
N1 = DK{ B } + F2                                      (4)
where DK{} denotes DES decryption using the key K.  N1 then
constitutes the first block of this variant of M1.
- For every i (i = 1, 2, ..., s) let:
Gi = EK{ Ni + Gi-1 }                                   (5)
where G0 is the all-zero block.
- Finally let:
Y = Gs                                                 (6)
Each variant (N1,...,Ns) is then stored along with its
corresponding value of Y.
Second prepare 232 variants of M2, each variant consisting of
a whole number of 64-bit blocks (although the number of blocks
in each variant may vary).  For each variant (having sequence
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of 64-bit blocks Ps+1, Ps+2, ..., Pr-1, say) do the following
computations:
- For every i (i = s+2, s+3, ..., r) let:
Hi = DK{ Hi-1 } + Pi-1                                 (7)
where Hs+1 = X.
- Let:
Pr = DK{ Hr }                                          (8)
where Pr then constitutes the last block of this variant.
- For every i (i = r-1, r-2, ..., s) let:
Li = DK{ Li+1 } + Pi+1                                 (9)
where Lr = C.
- Finally let:
Z = Ls                                                (10)
This value of Z is then compared with all the values of Y
resulting from the 232 variants of M1.  There is a good chance
that, before all 232 variants of M2 have been processed, a
match (i.e. a pair of values Y, Z such that Y = Z) will be
found; we justify this claim below.  Now suppose that the
sequences (Ni) (1 < i < s) and (Pj) (s+1 < j < r) give a match
(i.e. using the above notation they have Ls = Gs).
We now show that the sequence of blocks obtained by
concatenating these two sequences, i.e. the sequence
N1, N2, ..., Ns, Ps+1, Ps+2, ..., Pr
will have BMAC (C,B).
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First let the sequences (Ci) and (Bi) (1 < i < r) be defined
from this concatenated sequence as in (1) and (2) above.  We
need to show that Cr = C and B1 = B.
Comparing equations (1) and (5) we see that
Ci = Gi  (1 < i < s).
Now, since Y = Gs (by (6)), Y = Z, and Z = Ls (by (10)), if we
invert (9) we obtain:
Ci = Li  (s < i < r)
and, since Lr = C, we have Cr = C.
Similarly, comparing equations (2), (7) and (8) we see that
Bi = Hi  (s+1 < i < r).
Now, since X = Hs+1 (by (7)) and X = Fs+1 (by (3)), (3)
immediately yields:
Bi = Fi  (2 < i < s+1).
Finally, since B1 = EK{ N1 + B2 }, (4) immediately gives us
B = B1, as required.
C.  Remarks on the above attack
The above attack does require a non-trivial amount of
processing time and data storage, although neither of these
two requirements make the attack infeasible.  The attack
requires the processing of some 233 part-messages, and a
number of DES encryptions/decryptions are required for each
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such part-message.  However, the key is fixed throughout, and
DES hardware is both available and cheap which can perform in
excess of 105 DES encryptions/decryptions per second (i.e. in
excess of 233 DES operations in a 24-hour period).  Even in
software, DES can be made to run reasonably fast;
implementations exist capable of performing 104 DES operations
per second on a personal work-station (given the key is
fixed).  Thus if we assume that each part-message contains 10
DES blocks (i.e. 640 bytes), the DES processing could be
completed in 80 workstation-days.  Such a resource would often
be trivially available (using 'spare' machine cycles) to
anyone working in, say, an academic computing envorinment.
The storage requirement for the above method is probably
slightly more difficult to achieve, although it is by no means
infeasible to a determined attacker.  It requires the storage
of 232 message variants, together with their corresponding
values of Y.  Indeed, it would be reasonable to sort these
variants by their values of Y to make the matching process
more simple.  This is a lot of data, namely 32(m+1) Gigabytes,
where m is the number of blocks in each variant.  For example,
if we let m be 10 (as before) we require a data store of 350
Gbytes (and the processing time for sorting this data).  On-
line stores of this size, although very expensive to purchase,
commonly exist in large commercial and academic institutions,




Finally note that we asserted in the above text that the
probability of a match being found was good, without giving
any justification for such a claim.  In general, if samples of
size u and v are drawn independently at random from a
population of size N with replacement, then the probability
that there will be a match between the two samples is
approximated by
Pmatch  =  1 - ( (N-u) / N )v  =  1 - ( 1 - u/N )v.
given u is small compared to N.  Under the same assumption, a
further approximation gives:
Pmatch  =  1 - exp( -uv/N ).
If N = 264 and u = v = 232, we get Pmatch = 1 - 1/e > 0.5,
thus justifying our claim (if we assume that the DES
encryption operation generates randomly distributed 64-bit
blocks).
The assumption u = v = 232 was chosen primarily for
illustrative purposes, and could, for example, be adjusted so
as to give a higher probability of success.  Alternatively the
values could be adjusted to reflect the available resources of
processing and/or storage.  For example, u (the number of
variants of M1) might be chosen to be significantly smaller,
and v correspondingly higher, so as to reduce the storage





In any authentication scheme for multi-cast messages using the
method described in the Internet RFCs, it is most important
that the BMAC scheme should not be used.  As far as
alternatives are concerned, the basic recommendation given by
Mitchell and Walker, [16], remains sound.  That is, the
function h should be chosen to have the property H1.
A suggestion for how such a function can be constructed from a
block cipher such as DES has been put forward by Winternitz,
[16], [17], [18], and this method remains a good candidate for
schemes such as the Internet mail system.  Alternative methods
based on the use of DES are discussed by Merkle, [14].  Other
promising techniques have recently been proposed by Rivest,
including the algorithm to be found in RFC 1115, [13], and an
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